

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 00027 01 OF 02 030621Z

16

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-11 COME-00 NEA-10 EUR-25 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01 IO-14 AF-10

TRSE-00 DRC-01 AID-20 SCEM-02 INT-08 SCI-06 CU-04

/204 W

----- 005457

R 030535Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9017

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 0027

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA/XC

SUBJ: TANAKA'S TOUR OF SE ASIA

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO FONOFF SOURCES, ON HIS JAN 7-17 TOUR OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 00027 01 OF 02 030621Z

THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA, AND INDONESIA,

PRIMIN TANAKA WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE JAPAN'S IMAGE OF EXCESSIVE ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST, STRENGTHEN POLITICAL TIES AND, IT IS HOPED, HELP ASSURE JAPANESE ACCESS TO SEA RESOURCES, MARKETS AND INVESTMENTS. THE VISIT TAKES PLACE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF INCREASING ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. FONOFF HOPES TO KEEP TANAKA TALKS ON HIGH PLANE AND AVOID DETAILS OF ECONOMIC ISSUES WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE THE SOURCE OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENTS. TANAKA WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO DISCUSSION OF INCREASED REGIONAL COOPERATION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, BUT IS NOT EXPECTED TO TAKE LEAD IN RESPONDING ANY NEW REGIONAL GROUPINGS. HE WILL EXPLAIN JAPAN'S NEW MIDEAST POLICY AND DISCUSS JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, FOREMOST ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA. END SUMMARY.

1. EMBASSY VIEW OF JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE: ON HIS JAN 7-17 TOUR OF SE ASIAN COUNTRIES, PRIMIN TANAKA WILL ATTEMPT TO FURTHER FOUR GOJ POLICY OBJECTIVES: 1) IMPROVE JAPAN'S IMAGE OF EXCESSIVE ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST; 2) SOLIDIFY RELATIONS AND THEREBY HELP ASSURE ACCESS TO RESOURCES, MARKETS, AND INVESTMENT POSSIBILITIES; 3) STRENGTHEN JAPAN'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ASIA; AND 4) MITIGATE RESIDUAL ANIMOSITY FROM WW II. HIS TOUR (THE PHILIPPINES JAN 7-9, THAILAND 9-11, SINGAPORE 11-12, MALAYSIA 12-14, INDONESIA 14-17) TAKES PLACE AGAINST A BACKDROP OF GROWING EVIDENCE OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN SE ASIA, PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUTH AND INTELLECTUALS. THIS IS\* MOST PROMINENT IN THAILAND, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT WAS A THEME IN THAILAND'S OCTOBER REVOLUTION, AND IN INDONESIA, WHERE ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT HAS RECENTLY SPARKED SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS AND TAKEN ON INCREASINGLY MENACING OVERTONES. (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, JAKARTA 13882 AND 14473 - NOTAL) AS IT HAPPENS, JAPAN'S GREATEST INTERESTS ARE IN INDONESIA AND THAILAND, AND JAPAN'S POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE AREA EMPHASIZE THOSE TWO COUNTRIES: INDONESIA AS A SOURCE FOR ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AND AS A LEADER OF SE ASIA, AND THAILAND AS PRIME AREA FOR TRADE AND INVESTMENT. CRITICISM OF JAPAN IN SE ASIA CENTERS ON AGGRESSIVE JAPANESE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ON FEARS OF ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OF LOCAL ECONOMIES. TANAKA ACKNOWLEDGED IN HIS NEW YEAR'S PRESS CONFERENCE THAT ACTIVITIES BY QTE UGLY JAPANESE UNQTE AND QTE UNHEALTHY ECONOMIC TIES UNQTE HAVE STIMULATED SUCH SENTIMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 00027 01 OF 02 030621Z

2. JAPANESE SCENARIO: IN DISCUSSIONS WITH FONOFF OFFICIALS (HANABUSA, HEAD FIRST SE ASIA DIV, AND TAKASHIMA, ACTING HEAD SECOND SE ASIA DIV), THEY EMPHASIZED THAT TANAKA'S MOST IMPORTANT GOAL IS TO ALTER JAPAN'S IMAGE AS A NATION OF QTE ECONOMIC ANIMALS UNQTE AND SECONDLY, TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL TIES WITH THE SE ASIANS. TANAKA DOES NOT WISH TO APPEAR EITHER AS QTE SALESMAN UNQTE OR QTE BUYER UNQTE DURING HIS

TOUR. TAKSHIMA SAID THAT WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE BROAD AREAS: 1) INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, INCLUDING MIDEAST; 2) ASIAN QUESTIONS, INCLUDING JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR CHINA; AND 3) BILATERAL QUESTIONS. IF THE FONOFF HAS ITS WAY, TANAKA WILL ESCHEW DISCUSSION OF ECONOMICS AND ENERGY (EXCEPT WITH INDONESIA), EXEPT AS PART OF BROAD DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

3. THE FONOFF ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HOST COUNTRIES MIGHT INSIST ON DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THAT TANAKA WOULD HAVE TO MAKE GENERAL RESPONSES. FONOFF SAID THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR TANAKA TO CONDUCT CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN AGREEMENTS DURING THE VISITS (AGAIN, EXCEPT POSSIBLY WITH INDONESIA). (SEE TOKYO 15570-NOTAL) THE FONOFF ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SE ASIANS MAY CONFRONT TANAKA OVER POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF JAPANESE EXPORTS TO SE ASIA, BECAUSE OF THE OIL CRISIS, OF SUCH VITALS AS CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS, STEEL, AND NEWSPRINT, AND POSSIBLE CUTBACKS IN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. (JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO SEASIA ACCOUNT MINIMALLY FOR OVER A QUARTER OF TOTAL IMPORTS FOR THE REGION, WITH A RAPIDLY GROWING TRADE IMBALANCE IN JAPAN'S FAVOR.) CONCERN IN THIS AREA IS A RESULT OF STATEMENTS OUT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS CIRCLES THAT SOME EXPORT CURTAILMENT HAS BEEN REQUIRED AND OF DISCUSSION HERE OF THE NEED TO CURB FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO IMPROVE JAPAN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION. IN THE RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATION, TANAKA WILL PROBABLY BE UNABLE TO OFFER MORE THAN GENERAL PROMISE TO KEEP SE ASIA CONCERNS IN MIND IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 00027 02 OF 02 030635Z

16  
ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-11 COME-00 NEA-10 EUR-25 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01 IO-14 AF-10

TRSE-00 DRC-01 AID-20 SCEM-02 INT-08 SCI-06 CU-04

/204 W

----- 005545

R 030535Z JAN 74  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9018  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USLO PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 0027

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

4. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: HANABUSA AND TAKASHIMA SAID THAT DURING TANAKA'S SE ASIAN TOUR, HE WILL NOT ADVOCATE ANY NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL GROUPINGS NOR SEEK MODIFICATION OF ASEAN. GOJ BASICALLY WELCOMES REGIONAL COOPERATION BUT REALIZES THAT ASEAN COUNTRIES WOULD REGARD WITH SUSPICION CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 00027 02 OF 02 030635Z

ANY JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO URGE ANY NEW REGIONAL INITIATIVES AT THIS TIME. HANABUSA AND TAKASHIMA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT JAPAN WOULD INCREASINGLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH ASEAN AS A UNIT ON CERTAIN ISSUES, BUT THEY STRESSED THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE MOST IMPORTANT. ANOTHER FACTOR IN JAPAN'S CALCULATIONS IS INDONESIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER ITS OWN ROLE IN ASEAN AND ITS VIEW OF JAPAN AS A RIVAL FOR INFLUENCE IN SE ASIA. THE FONOFF DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY APPEAL DURING TANAKA'S TRIP FOR ASSISTANCE FROM JAPAN TO ASEAN AS AN ORGANIZATION, SINCE EACH COUNTRY WOULD PRESUMABLY BE SEEKING FUNDS FOR ITSELF.

5. THE CHINESE ANGLE: JAPANESE ANTICIPATE THAT SE ASIAN WILL BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN'S VIEWS ON CHINA'S ATTITUDES TOWARD SE ASIA. THIS INTEREST IS NOT EXPECTED TO RESULT IN REQUESTS FOR JAPAN'S ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY WITH CHINA, SINCE SE ASIAN CONCERN OVER A SINO-JAPANESE ENTENTE TO SE ASIA'S DETRIMENT IS STILL

ACTIVE. TANAKA WILL TAKE A POSITIVE LINE ON JAPAN'S IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

6. COMMENT: THE MIDEAST CRISIS HAS GREATLY HEIGHTENED JAPAN'S SENSITIVITIES TO ITS RELATIONS WITH LDCS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM WHICH JAPAN DRAWS ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES. THIS GENERAL CONCERN IS PARTICULARLY STRONG WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN'S ASIAN NEIGHBORS. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THAILAND AND INDONESIA HAVE RAISED THE NIGHTMARE OF DETERIORATING RELATIONS IN WHAT IS CONSIDERED BY MANY JAPANESE AS JAPAN'S PRIME AREA OF INFLUENCE. WHETHER TANAKA CAN SUCCEED IN AMELIORATING JAPAN'S IMAGE IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. HOWEVER, CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE FONOFF OVER THE COMING TRIP HIGHLIGHTS JAPAN'S ANXIETIES OVER OBTAINING RESOURCES, OVER ITS EVOLVING ROLE IN ASIA, AND OVER THE OBVIOUS DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS, AT LEAST COSMETIC, FROM TANAKA'S SE ASIAN SWING.

7. THE TIMING OF TANAKA'S TRIP WAS DETERMINED IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT LAST FALL - THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUBLIC AN EFFECTIVE PRESENCE IN ASIA. THE INTRUSION OF THE OIL/RAW MATERIALS PROBLEMS IN THE INTERIM, AND SIGNS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 00027 02 OF 02 030635Z

OF IMAGE PROBLEMS IN KEY COUNTRIES, PROBABLY WILL TRIGGER CHARGES FROM TANAKA'S CRITICS THAT HE IS ONCE AGAIN A STEP TOO SLOW TO BE EFFECTIVE. HE IS COMMITTED, THOUGH, AND NO DOUBT HOPES HE CAN SIDESTEP SERIOUS ISSUES WHILE CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF FAST-MOVING DYNAMISM OF LEADERSHIP ON A REGIONAL PLANE.  
SHOESMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 JAN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974TOKYO00027  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** TOKYO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740163/aaaachqk.tel  
**Line Count:** 259  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 JUL 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 JUL 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <19 DEC 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** TANAKA'S TOUR OF SE ASIA SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO FONOFF SOURCES, ON HIS JAN 7-17 TOUR OF  
**TAGS:** PFOR, JA, XC, (TANAKA)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005